

Gross v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 5:24-cv-02069-EJD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2026).
A federal court held that an Insured v. Insured exclusion (the “Exclusion”) in a D&O policy barred coverage for a shareholder’s derivative action after they became a director of the insured company (the “Company.”) The court reasoned that the Exclusion applied even though the demand was made before the shareholder accepted that position.
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) revised its internal policies to clarify that nonbinding agency guidance could not, by itself, establish liability. The revised policy barred the DOJ from bringing civil or criminal enforcement actions based solely on a party’s failure to follow nonbinding agency guidance.
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Insoft v. Hiscox Insurance Co., No. 25-12533 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2026).
A student sued the school (the “Insured”), alleging that classmates bullied him and that, during a school trip, he was placed in a hotel room with them and subjected to an attempted sexual assault.
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Homeland Ins. Co. of Del. v. O’Hara-Rusckowski, 25 Civ. 864 (JPC) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2026).
In a coverage litigation matter, a New York federal court declined to decide whether a carrier owed a defense or indemnity to an insured because resolving the coverage dispute required determining whether the insured acted in an official or personal capacity, an issue the litigation court was better positioned to decide.
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A court held that subsequent lawsuits fell outside the policy period because they arose from the same interrelated wrongful acts alleged in an earlier demand.
A real estate brokerage (the “Company”) and its officers sought coverage under the Company’s D&O policy for government consumer protection lawsuits challenging a homeowner benefit program. Under the allegedly deceptive program, the Company would pay homeowners an upfront amount in exchange for the right to act as their listing broker if they later decided to sell their homes. The agreement made the Company the exclusive real estate listing broker for a period of 40 years and included substantial penalties for breach of the agreement. The carrier denied coverage, in part, because the Company had received several pre-policy subpoenas, investigative demands, and regulatory inquiries, which were never noticed.
The policy covered claims first made during the policy period for a wrongful act before or during the policy period, and defined a claim to include written demands, civil proceedings, administrative or regulatory proceedings, and certain investigations naming insured persons. The policy also stated that all claims arising from the same or related wrongful acts would be treated as a single claim first made when the earliest related claim was made.
The court held that coverage was not available. The initial pre-policy demand letter from a consumer stated that the homeowner benefit program was substantively unconscionable and demanded the immediate rescission of the agreement. The Company argued that the demand had been resolved when it paid the consumer a termination fee, and therefore those circumstances could not give rise to a future claim. The court found that the “mere fact that a claim has been resolved does not operate to ‘unmake’ the claim or relieve the Insured of representing its existence in a claims-made Policy.” Because the later lawsuits involved the same program, agreement, and alleged deceptive business practices, they arose from the same or related wrongful acts and were therefore treated as a single claim.

A federal court held that an Insured v. Insured exclusion (the “Exclusion”) in a D&O policy barred coverage for a shareholder’s derivative action after they became a director of the insured company (the “Company.”) The court reasoned that the Exclusion applied even though the demand was made before the shareholder accepted that position.
The shareholder demanded that the Company’s board pursue claims against a director for mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duties. While the investigation was ongoing, the shareholder agreed to purchase shares and become the Company’s sole director if the change would not interfere with the ongoing claim. The shareholder accepted the position after a claims specialist allegedly said the claim remained eligible for coverage, but shortly thereafter resigned.
The policy stated, in relevant part that an “Insurer shall not be liable for Loss under this Coverage Section on account of any Claim . . . brought or maintained by, on behalf of, in the right of, or at the direction of any Insured in any capacity . . . .” It defined “Insured” to include “any person who was, now is, or shall become . . . a duly elected or appointed director . . . .”
The court found no temporal limitation in the Exclusion’s wording. Once the shareholder became a director, they became an Insured, and the Exclusion applied. The court also rejected the derivative action exception, which applied only if the claim “is brought derivatively by a securities holder . . . and is instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation, assistance, active participation of, or intervention of, any Insured.” Once the shareholder became an Insured, the claim could not continue totally independently of an Insured.
Additionally, the court rejected the argument that the Exclusion applied only to collusive suits because the Exclusion explicitly barred coverage “whether or not collusive.” The court also held that the alleged oral assurance by a claims specialist, who said becoming a director would not affect coverage, could not create coverage contrary to the policy’s express terms. Therefore, the carrier owed no duty to defend or indemnify the directors and officers involved in the claim.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) revised its internal policies to clarify that nonbinding agency guidance could not, by itself, establish liability.
The revised policy barred the DOJ from bringing civil or criminal enforcement actions based solely on a party’s failure to follow nonbinding agency guidance. Instead, the DOJ will be required to base its actions on violations of applicable legal requirements. Guidance could still be used as evidence of knowledge or intent, to describe professional or industry standards, to show a party’s compliance, or to provide legal context. In a False Claims Act case, evidence that a party knew about guidance could help show knowledge of a legal requirement, but failure to follow the guidance alone would not establish a violation.
The revisions also directed DOJ attorneys to assess in each case whether seeking dismissal would serve the government’s interests when declining to intervene. If the DOJ did not seek dismissal at that stage, it could revisit the decision as litigation progressed. The existing, nonexclusive dismissal factors remained largely the same, including whether a case lacked merit, duplicated an investigation, interfered with agency programs, threatened government resources, or involved serious procedural errors.

A student sued the school (the “Insured”), alleging that classmates bullied him and that, during a school trip, he was placed in a hotel room with them and subjected to an attempted sexual assault. The professional liability carrier denied coverage, citing its sexual misconduct exclusion, which stated:
We will have no obligation to pay any sums under this Coverage Part, including any damages or claim expenses, for any claim based upon or arising out of any actual, alleged, or threatened abuse, molestation, harassment, mistreatment, or maltreatment of a sexual nature, including the negligent employment, investigation, supervision, training, or retention of a person who commits such conduct, or the failure to report such conduct to the proper authorities.
We will have no obligation to pay any sums under this Coverage Part, including any damages or claim expenses, for any claim based upon or arising out of any actual, alleged, or threatened abuse, molestation, harassment, mistreatment, or maltreatment of a sexual nature, including the negligent employment, investigation, supervision, training, or retention of a person who commits such conduct, or the failure to report such conduct to the proper authorities.
The Insured settled the matter with the student. As part of the settlement, the student received a monetary judgment and an assignment of the Insured’s rights under the policy. The student then sued the carrier, alleging breach of duty to defend, indemnify, and settle the underlying matter. The lower court dismissed the case in favor of the carrier; however, the reviewing court overturned the dismissal.
According to the court, the lower court mistakenly adopted the insurer’s argument that any non-sexual bullying was “inextricably” connected to the alleged sexual abuse because the bullying happened on the same day as the alleged abuse. The court did not disagree that such interpretation was reasonable; however, because on a motion-to-dismiss stage all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the non-moving party, the court highlighted that a different reasonable interpretation existed, too. Because it was possible that non-sexual bullying occurred over the course of the school year and continued before the sexual abuse allegation arose, the court drew the inference on unknown facts in favor of the Insured (as the motion to dismiss phase required). Thus, the court vacated the dismissal and remained the case for further proceeding.

In a coverage litigation matter, a New York federal court declined to decide whether a carrier owed a defense or indemnity to an insured because resolving the coverage dispute required determining whether the insured acted in an official or personal capacity, an issue the litigation court was better positioned to decide. The New York court concluded that deciding the issue before the Colorado court ruled could create inconsistent findings about the insured’s conduct.
The underlying Colorado action involved a nonprofit organization and several of its directors, collectively (the “Nonprofit”), who alleged that their former business partner (the “Partner”) and board member defamed them and interfered with their business relationships by making knowingly false statements to influential donors and organizations. The alleged statements purportedly resulted in terminated contracts, withdrawn donations, and organizations disavowing the plaintiffs. The Nonprofit initially sued the Partner and three related entities, alleging that the Partner acted both individually and in a representative capacity for the entities.
The carrier defended the Partner and the entities under a D&O policy issued to the entity. The policy covered wrongful acts committed by an insured person while acting as an executive or employee but excluded claims involving wrongful acts committed while the Partner served in any other capacity. Eventually, the entities were dismissed, and the Nonprofit filed an amended complaint naming the Partner individually. The amended complaint removed allegations that the Partner acted in a representative capacity and emphasized that they acted for their own personal benefit.
Following the amended complaint, the carrier sent the Partner a reservation of rights letter asserting its right to file a declaratory judgment action that it no longer had a duty to defend the Partner in the Colorado litigation. The carrier argued that the amended complaint alleged only personal conduct which was expressly excluded by the policy. The carrier also sought to rely on additional exclusions and to recoup defense costs if the court determined that no coverage existed.
The court concluded that deciding the duty-to-defend issue would require it to determine whether the Partner acted in an official or personal capacity. Because that issue remained relevant to the Colorado litigation, the Colorado court was the more appropriate forum to resolve it. The carrier argued that only two outcomes were possible (1) either the Partner acted in their official capacity, in which case the settlement agreement would eliminate their liability, or (2) they acted in their personal capacity, in which case the policy would not provide coverage. The court disagreed, explaining that the Partner could be found liable even if they acted in their official capacity, because the settlement agreement might preserve claims against them individually. The Colorado court could instead determine that the release did not apply while also finding that some of the insured’s conduct occurred in an official capacity.
A global medical technology company (the “Company”) identified a cybersecurity incident that disrupted access to information systems and business applications used to manufacture products and process customer orders. The Company informed investors that the outage is likely to have a material effect on the third quarter and full year results. Additionally, it is unlikely to meet previously issued sales growth and adjusted earnings guidance.
A federal court allowed biometric privacy class action against a railroad to proceed, holding the federal oversight of rail transportation did not displace the state’s biometric statute. The court held that the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) can apply to finger scans used to control access at intermodal facilities, even in an industry which is broadly subject to federal oversight.
New and existing federal and state laws are being used to protect organizations against AI impersonation. Impersonation has become easier, as AI-generated content can produce realistic images, videos, and audio that can easily replicate an individual’s personally identifiable characteristics. The appropriation of an individual’s image can pose many risks for organizations as well, especially if the individual is an employee or executive.
An Illinois federal court held that an insured’s failure to disclose known circumstances that might lead to employment claims materially affected the insurer’s risk and allowed it to rescind an EPLI policy. The court focused on the application’s question about possible future claims, not on whether a formal claim already existed under the policy.
The SEC has proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act of 1934 and amending Rule 14a-4. If adopted, these changes would restructure the federal proxy scheme.
The SEC Division of Examination staff (EXAM) highlighted recurring deficiencies in registered investment advisers’ annual compliance reviews. Advisers are required to review their compliance policies and procedures at least annually to determine whether they remain adequate and are being implemented effectively. EXAM emphasized that the review should consider compliance issues from the prior year, changes in the adviser’s business, and regulatory developments.
|
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
Eric Munson |
CEO |
Adit Ventures Management, LLC |
|
John Fanning |
Officer |
Netcaptial Inc. |
| Christopher A. Delgado | CEO | Goliath Ventures, Inc. |
| Andrew Speaventa | Founder | The Spaventa Group LLC |
| Daniel Chu | CEO | Tricolor Holdings LLC |
| Jesse R. Mitchell | Director | The Trade Desk, Inc. |
|
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
Eric Munson |
CEO |
Adit Ventures Management, LLC |
|
John Fanning |
Officer |
Netcapital Inc. |
|
Christopher A. Delgado |
CEO |
Goliath Ventures, Inc. |
| Andrew Spaventa | Founder | The Spaventa Group LLC |
| Daniel Chu | CEO | Tricolor Holdings LLC |
| Jesse R. Mitchell | Director | The Trade Desk, Inc. |
|
Amount |
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
$1,182,254 |
Peng Denggao |
CEO |
Adamant Stone Ltd. |
|
$1,152,316 |
Ricardo Jobity |
CEO/COO |
Wisdom Capital Management Group Ltd. |
|
$109,184.53 |
Archil Cheishvili |
Former CEO |
GenesisAI Corp. |
|
Amount |
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
$1,182,254 |
Peng Denggao |
CEO |
Adamant Stone Ltd. |
|
$1,152,316 |
Ricardo Jobity |
CEO/COO |
Wisdom Capital Management Group Ltd. |
|
$109,184.53 |
Archil Cheishvili |
Former CEO |
GenesisAI Corp. |
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin.htm
UWM Holdings Corporation


Robert Aratingi
robert.aratingi@alliant.com
Isabel Arustamyan, Esq.
isabel.arustamyan@alliant.com
Jaimi Berliner, Esq.
jaimi.berliner@alliant.com
Abbe Darr, Esq.
abbe.darr@alliant.com
David Finz, Esq.
david.finz@alliant.com
Peter Kelly, Esq.
peter.kelly@alliant.com
Steve Levine, Esq.
slevine@alliant.com
Chuck Madden, Esq.
chuck.madden@alliant.com
Karina Montoya, Esq.
karina.montoya@alliant.com
Malia Shappell, Esq.
malia.shappell@alliant.com
Sujal Vaidya, Esq.
sujal.vaidya@alliant.com
Jacqueline Vinar, Esq.
jacqueline.vinar@alliant.com