

Tri-Cnty. Tel. Ass’n v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 33641 (10th Cir. Nov. 3, 2026).
A D&O policy’s insured-versus-insured (“IvI”) exclusion barred coverage for a class action brought by former members of a nonprofit telecommunications cooperative who were also security holders.
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Scholastic Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 34107 (2nd Cir. Nov. 6, 2025).
We previously reported on a court’s decision that an excess carrier in a professional services liability program was required to cover remaining defense costs and the balance of the settlement amount. In the underlying matter, the carrier disputed whether the claim arose from professional services and involved a covered “Wrongful Act” as defined by the policy. The lower court’s decision siding with the insured was appealed and recently affirmed by the Second Circuit.
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BODILY INJURY EXCLUSION PRECLUDES COVERAGE FOR ENTIRE LAWSUIT DESPITE PRESENCE OF OTHER POTENTIALLY COVERED ALLEGATIONS
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Shore Mgmt., No. 26-CV-608 JLS (GC) (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2026).
A court held that the bodily injury exclusion precluded coverage for an entire claim despite the presence of non-bodily-injury-related allegations.
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Remedial Env’t Manpower, Inc. v. Phila. Idem. Ins. Co., 26 cv 2194 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2026).
An Illinois federal court held that a staffing firm’s professional liability carrier had no duty to defend employee wage and hour claims because the policy excluded claims between insureds under the Insured v. Insured exclusion (the “Exclusion”).
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The court held that a D&O policy covered the Insured company’s (the “Company”) indemnification of its officer’s criminal defense costs because the policy endorsement covered indemnification required by law.
The officer was indicted for allegedly defrauding the Company, and the officer’s counsel tendered that criminal action to the Company’s D&O carrier. The Company refused to indemnify the officer, but the carrier acknowledged its duty to defend the officer.
While the criminal action was pending, the officer sued the Company for advancement of defense costs based on the Company’s bylaws and an indemnification agreement. The officer prevailed in the advancement action and eventually in the criminal action as well. The Company paid the officer’s defense expenses; however, the D&O carrier refused to reimburse the Company based, in part, on the insured-versus-insured exclusion and no-voluntary-payments provision.
The policy’s Side B insuring clause covered “Loss resulting from any Claim if indemnification by the Company for such Claim is required or permitted by applicable law, to the fullest extent so required or permitted, regardless of whether or not such actual indemnification by the Company is made . . ..” Because Delaware law required indemnification after the officer prevailed in the criminal proceeding, the court found the Company’s payment was covered.
The insured-versus-insured exclusion did not change that result. Although it barred claims brought by or on behalf of an insured, the court distinguished the officer’s advancement action, which was brought by the officer against the Company, from the Company’s indemnification obligation that arose from the criminal proceeding’s outcome. Ultimately, the Company would have been required to indemnify the officer for the criminal action and could not be barred by the exclusion.
The court also addressed the no-voluntary-payments provision. The provision required the insurer’s prior written consent before an insured incurred costs or assumed obligations. The officer had retained counsel prior to tendering the defense of the criminal action and had refused to change counsel once the carrier accepted coverage. The court found that the no-voluntary-payments provision bars recovery only when an insured that violates the provision. The policy distinguished between the "Company" and "Insured Persons," including "Directors and Officers." Therefore, the officer’s violation of the provision could not bar the Company’s recovery under Side B, and the Company’s indemnification was legally required, not voluntarily assumed without consent.

A D&O policy’s insured-versus-insured (“IvI”) exclusion barred coverage for a class action brought by former members of a nonprofit telecommunications cooperative who were also security holders. The policy’s former-managers carveout did not apply because the lead plaintiff sued less than one year after their board service ended.
A former director opposed a transaction to acquire another company and, after it closed, filed a class action alleging breach of fiduciary duty against the cooperative and several former directors and officers. The class consisted of former members who were deemed security holders. The insurer denied coverage for defense costs under the D&O policy, relying in part on the policy’s IvI exclusion.
The exclusion applied to claims “brought or maintained by or on behalf of any Insureds . . . or any security holder of an Insured Entity.” The court rejected the argument that the exclusion should apply only to collusive suits or disputes among directors. Because the former Manager was an Insured and every class member was a security holder, the exclusion barred coverage.
A carveout to the exclusion stated that the exclusion would not apply to “a civil proceeding by or on behalf of a former Manager who has not served in such capacity for at least one year prior to such Claim being made, provided that such Claim is made without the assistance, participation or solicitation of any current Manager or any Former Manager who has served in such capacity during the one year prior to such Claim being made.” The court determined that although the former director’s last board meeting occurred earlier, his service continued until the board was formally dissolved. Because the suit was filed less than one year after the board was dissolved, the carveout did not apply.
We previously reported on a court’s decision that an excess carrier in a professional services liability program was required to cover remaining defense costs and the balance of the settlement amount. In the underlying matter, the carrier disputed whether the claim arose from professional services and involved a covered “Wrongful Act” as defined by the policy. The lower court’s decision siding with the insured was appealed and recently affirmed by the Second Circuit.
The Insured entered a licensing agreement with a university to develop and sell learning software. The university accused the Insured of breaching that agreement by failing to pay royalties for several academic products. The parties settled following summary judgment when two claims remained: breach of contract and trademark infringement.
The primary policy was exhausted by payment of some Defense Costs and a portion of the settlement. The Insured sought the remaining amounts (the unpaid defense costs and the remainder of the settlement) from the excess carrier.
The excess carrier denied coverage, arguing the losses were not caused by the rendering of professional services, which were undefined in the follow-form policy, and breach of contract was not a "Wrongful Act" covered by the followed policy. The excess carrier argued the loss arose from the Insured’s failure to get permission to use the university’s trademarks in the Insured’s advertising and marketing of its products and “advertising and marketing” was not a professional service.
The court concluded that developing, publishing, and selling educational products involved the Insured’s specialized skill and training. Those activities caused the underlying dispute over whether the products used licensed intellectual property and triggered royalty obligations. The fact that the university’s claims were premised on alleged misappropriation did not, by itself, remove the Insured's conduct from the scope of "professional services."
The court further found that the contract claim was not merely a failure to pay money owed and the university would have had a basis for relief even without the license agreement. The court held that the policy covered the settlement, including both the contract and trademark claims, so no allocation between them was necessary.
Finally, the court addressed the policy’s provision that it “will continue in force as underlying insurance” upon exhaustion of the primary policy. It read that clause to give the excess insurer the same obligations for covered costs that the primary insurer had at exhaustion. Accordingly, covered defense costs incurred before exhaustion were not excluded simply because they had been incurred earlier.

A court held that the bodily injury exclusion precluded coverage for an entire claim despite the presence of non-bodily-injury-related allegations.
The decision stemmed from a complaint made against the Insured that alleged, among other things, bodily injury, property damage, and professional negligence. The Insured submitted the complaint to its carrier and began incurring defense costs with the belief that the carrier was obligated to reimburse.
Although the underlying policy imposed a duty to defend on the carrier, the carrier argued it owed no duty to defend this claim because the policy’s broad exclusion language barred claims that “in any way involved” allegations of bodily injury. Even though potentially covered professional negligence causes of action remained, the court held that the plain reading of the exclusion in conjunction with the policy’s definition of a claim barred coverage.
The court also considered the policy’s definition of a claim. The policy defined a claim, in relevant part, as any judicial proceeding initiated against the Insured. The court held that the policy language unambiguously indicated that a judicial proceeding referred to an entire lawsuit. The court further held that insurers had the right to exclude coverage for an entire lawsuit based on a singular cause of action and highlighted that its holding was consistent with previous decisions under the governing state law.

An Illinois federal court held that a staffing firm’s professional liability carrier had no duty to defend employee wage and hour claims because the policy excluded claims between insureds under the Insured v. Insured exclusion (the “Exclusion”).
The staffing firm (the “Company”) supplied workers to a poultry processor. Employees alleged that the Company and the processor jointly hired, fired, and supervised them, set their pay, and controlled their schedules. The employees sued both businesses as joint employers, alleging unpaid time spent putting on and removing required protective gear as well as shortened meal periods and wage deductions for protective equipment. The Company sought a defense under its Staffing Service Professional Liability coverage from its carrier.
The court found that the allegations fell within the policy’s coverage for negligent acts, errors, or omissions in providing staffing services, which included administrative and human resources functions. The Company’s alleged failures involving employee pay and work schedules satisfied those definitions but did not resolve whether the Exclusion barred coverage.
The Exclusion barred claims brought by one insured against another. The policy expanded the definition of an “Insured” to include employees acting within their duties and former employees for professional services performed before separation. The policy’s definition of “employee” included staffing service employees supplied to clients. Consequently, both the Company and the employees qualified as insureds.
The Company argued that the employees’ claims fell outside the scope of their employment duties. The court disagreed because the alleged claims arose from required work. Putting on and removing protective equipment, for example, was necessary to perform their jobs, and thus seeking compensation for that time did not place the claims outside the Exclusion.
The Company further argued that applying the Exclusion eliminated the very protection for which the policy was purchased. The court explained that coverage remained available for claims involving negligent worker selection or placement. Excluding employee claims, therefore, did not render the coverage meaningless.
The SEC’s Division of Examinations has made firms’ readiness for AI-enabled cyberattacks a priority for fiscal year of 2027, while also signaling closer scrutiny of how registrants use AI in investment advice, compliance, and operations.
The Eleventh Circuit revived an employee stock ownership plan lawsuit, holding that ERISA itself did not require participants to complete internal plan review before suing for fiduciary breaches.
The SEC approved changes, via amendments, to FINRA Rule 2210 that would allow broker-dealers to share investment projections and targeted returns, subject to audience, disclosure, and recordkeeping requirements.
The SEC issued a substantial fine against an investment advisor over lapses in its identity theft prevention and for its failure to submit some of its records to an external auditor. The firm agreed to pay the penalty to terminate the SEC’s investigation into its management of cyber risk, and possible violation of regulatory requirements around protection of client assets.
|
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
David Reichman |
Former CEO |
Global Tech Industries Group, Inc. |
|
Gökçe Güven |
Founder/CEO |
Kalder Inc. |
| Darren J. Caris | Founder | Caris Investment Partners, Inc. |
| Jeremiah Silkowski | CEO/COO | SQN Capital Management LLC |
| William Sarris Joseph Endoso | Former Executives | Linqto, Inc. |
| Jason R. Anderson | Principal | Blox Lending, LLC |
|
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
David Reichman |
Former CEO |
Global Tech Industries Group, Inc. |
|
Gökçe Güven |
Founder/CEO |
Kalder Inc. |
|
Darren J. Caris |
Founder |
Caris Investment Partners, Inc. |
| Jeremiah Silkowski | CEO/COO | SQN Capital Management LLC |
| William Sarris Joseph Endoso | Former Executives | Linqto, Inc. |
| Jason R. Anderson | Principal | Blox Lending, LLc |
|
Amount |
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
$103,000,000 |
Stephen Kenneth Leech II |
COI |
Western Asset Management Company LLC |
|
$12,112,468 |
Kenneth W. Alexander Caedrynn E. Conner |
Founders |
Vanguard Holdings Group Irrevocable Trust (VHG) |
|
$236,451 |
Matthew Brown |
Founder |
Matthew Brown Companies, LLC |
| $227,631.02 | Nihat Cardak | Former CFO | GigaMedia Access Corporation |
| $910,577 | Bran Crudden | Founder | Transparent equity Entrepreneurs, LLC |
|
Amount |
Director/Officer |
Role |
Company |
|
$103,000,000 |
Stephen Kenneth Leech II |
COI |
Western Asset Management Company LLC |
|
$12,112,468 |
Kenneth W. Alexander Caedrynn E. Conner |
Founders |
Vanguard Holdings Group Irrevocable Trust (VHG) |
|
$ 236,451 |
Matthew Brown |
Founder |
Matthew Brown Companies, LLC |
|
$227,631.02 |
Nihat Cardak |
Former CFO |
GigaMedia Access Corporation |
|
$910,577 |
Bran Crudden |
Founder |
Transparent Equity Entrepreneurs, LLC |
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin.htm


Robert Aratingi
robert.aratingi@alliant.com
Isabel Arustamyan, Esq.
isabel.arustamyan@alliant.com
Jaimi Berliner, Esq.
jaimi.berliner@alliant.com
Sarah Y. Cho, Esq.
sarah.cho@alliant.com
Abbe Darr, Esq.
abbe.darr@alliant.com
David Finz, Esq.
david.finz@alliant.com
Peter Kelly, Esq.
peter.kelly@alliant.com
Steve Levine, Esq.
slevine@alliant.com
Chuck Madden, Esq.
chuck.madden@alliant.com
Karina Montoya, Esq.
karina.montoya@alliant.com
Malia Shappell, Esq.
malia.shappell@alliant.com
Jacqueline Vinar, Esq.
jacqueline.vinar@alliant.com